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CASE COMMENT: CANADA (A-G) V. S.D. MEYERS,
INC., [2004] 3 F.C.J. NO. 29.
ANGELA COUSINS†

I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 11 of NAFTA grants substantive and procedural rights to investors of a NAFTA country who invest in another NAFTA jurisdiction. It
allows citizens of Canada, the US and Mexico, who invest in another
NAFTA country, the right to obtain damages for government measures
in violation of the provisions of Chapter 11.1 The provisions of Chapter
11 have been the subject of both criticism and acclaim. Chapter 11 has
villain seeking to maximize private business interests at the expense of
national public interest.
Chapter 11 is aimed at providing stability and reducing uncertainty with respect to decisions on whether to invest in the countries of
NAFTA.2 Because there is no appellate tribunal designated within Chapter 11, arbitral decisions are subject to judicial review by domestic courts
only in limited circumstances. However, the standard of review which
the domestic courts of Canada, the United States and Mexico must apply to Chapter 11 arbitration cases is uncertain.3 The recent decision of
the Federal Court in Canada (A.G.) v. S.D. Meyers, Inc.4 is an important
case because it indicates the standard of review which Canadian courts
will apply to the decisions of Chapter 11 arbitral tribunals. In addition,
before the losing party’s own judiciary.
†
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Patricia Isela Hansen, “Judicialization and Globalization in the North American Free Trade
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2
Joseph A. McKinney, Created From NAFTA (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2000)
at 224 [McInney].
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Supra note 1at 498.
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Canada (A-G) v. S.D. Meyers, Inc., [2004] 3 F.C.J. No. 29 [Meyers].
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II. FACTS OF THE CASE
Canada made an application to seek judicial review of arbitration awards
issued against it pursuant to Chapter 11 of NAFTA.5 The application,
made by Canada pursuant to Article 34 of the Commercial Arbitration
Code, sought to have the Federal Court set aside decisions made by the
Arbitral Tribunal with regard to awards of liability, damages and costs
to S.D. Myers, Inc (“SDMI”). 6
S.D. Meyers Inc. is a privately-owned Ohio-based toxic waste treatment company which became interested in expanding its operations into
Canada in the 1990s, as the market for its services began declining in
the United States. To this end, S.D. Meyers (Canada) Inc. was incorporated in 1993; the company intended to transport materials which were
contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from Canada to
the company’s Ohio site, and dispose of them there.7
In 1995, the United States Environmental Protection (EPA) issued
an “enforcement discretion” permitting SDMI to import PCBs subject
to certain conditions. Canada immediately responded by issuing a temporary ban on PCB waste exports to the United States; this ban remained
in effect for fourteen months. During this period SDMI was unable to
import the toxic waste to its Ohio facility.8
When the border was re-opened, SDMI submitted an arbitration
claim under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, asserting that the ban violated NAFof treatment, the prohibition on performance requirements, and compensation for expropriation. Pursuant to Article 1116, SDMI asserted that it
had sustained damages because its investment in Canada had suffered
harm as a result of the measure taken by Canada.9 The Arbitral Tribunal
found that Canada had violated its obligations in terms of national treatment and the minimum standard of treatment.10
The Federal Court found that, according to Article 34 of the Commercial Arbitration Code, judicial review is not provided for, despite
5

S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award [Meyers, Partial Award].
S.D. Meyers, supra note 4 at para. 3.
7
Ibid. at para. 3.
8
Ibid. at paras. 8-9.
9
Ibid. at para. 9.
10
Meyers, Partial Award, supra note 7 at para. 322.
6
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the fact that the arbitral decision may be based on an error of law or an
11
In its decision the Federal Court held that
because Canada had failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction at the outset
of the arbitration process, it could not do so after the fact, as this “would
undermine the clear and express procedures incorporated in NAFTA for
the resolution of disputes.”12
However, in the event that it was mistaken in this regard, the Court
went on to consider the standard of review applicable to the arbitral
decision. The Federal Court concluded that the application for judicial
review should be dismissed, holding that the decision of the Tribunal
investment of SDMI, that SDMI could be protected by Articles 11 and
12 concurrently, and that SDMI and Canadian providers of toxic waste
disposal services were in “like circumstances”.13 Finally, the Court held
that the Tribunal’s awards were not in violation of Canadian public policy.14

III. OPPORTUNITY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Article 1136(3)(b) allows for national courts to revise, set aside or annul awards of arbitral tribunals. However, in Meyers, the Federal Court
recognized that Article 34 of the Commercial Arbitration Code limits
the Court’s scope for judicial review of a NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration decision. Referring to the two other Canadian cases addressing the
issue—The United States v. Metalclad Corp.15 and The United Mexican
States v. Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa16—the Federal Court held that in
the case at bar the arbitral awards may only be set aside if the Attorney
General of Canada could prove that: (a) the awards deal with a dispute
not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration, or (b) the awards contain decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration.17
11

S.D. Myers, supra note 4 at 42.
Ibid. at para. 53.
13
Ibid. at para. 74.
14
Ibid. at para. 56.
15
(2001), 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359 [Metalclad].
16
[2003] O.J. No. 5070 [Feldman].
17
S.D. Meyers, supra note 4 at para. 44.
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The Court held that because Canada had not raised the issue as to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal at the outset of the arbitration, it could not
do so now, as this would undermine the clear and express procedures
incorporated in NAFTA for the resolution of disputes.18 Thus, the Federal Court concluded that, according to Article 21(3) of the UNICITRAL
Arbitration Rules, it lacked a basis on which to judicially review the
Tribunal’s decision. If the Court were to hold differently, the likelihood
of parties “shopping around” for different outcomes to arbitration deciOf course, this would negatively impact the effectiveness of Chapter 11
arbitral decisions.
In Myers, Canada attempted to argue that an error of law in the application of Articles 1102 and 1105 brought the matter within the scope
of judicial review. This argument is similar to one made in Metalclad,
where Mexico submitted that “a patently unreasonable error can amount
to an excess of jurisdiction.”19 The Court in that case appears to have left
the issue open, not deciding on the issue as it did not believe there to be
such an error. The Court did take note, however, that Quinette Coal20 indicated that the domestic test of patently unreasonable error did not apply to the International Commercial Arbitration Act.21 Here, the Court
rejected the argument on the basis that Article 34 of the Commercial
Arbitration Code does not allow errors of law or fact to be grounds for
judicial review if the decision is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.22
Nonetheless, the Court went on to consider the appropriate standard of
review to be applied to the Tribunal’s decision in the event the Court

IV. THE FEDERAL COURT’S APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In Myers, the Court considered Metalclad, Feldman and Quinette Coal
and concluded that contrary to Canada’s arguments, the “pragmatic and
18

Ibid. at 53.
Metalclad, supra note 15 at para. 92.
20
Quinette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp., [1990] B.C.J. No. 2241 (BCCA). This case involved
international arbitration between two private parties.
21
Metalclad, supra note 15 at para 97.
22
S.D. Myers, supra note 4 at para. 42.
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functional” approach to judicial review of domestic administrative tribunals does not apply to international arbitration tribunals.23 A pragmatic and functional approach cannot be used to create a standard of
review not provided for in the International Commercial Arbitration
Act.24 Further, the Court noted that the Supreme Court of Canada has
stated that review of the correctness of arbitration decisions “ignores
the fact that the legislature has voluntarily placed limits on such review,
to preserve the autonomy of the arbitration system.”25 However, later
in the Myers judgment, the Court refers to Dynamex Canada, Inc. v.
Momona26 and states:
in applying the “pragmatic and functional approach” the Federal
Court held that on questions of law normally considered by the
Courts, and not on questions that engage the special expertise of
the tribunal or require the application of the facts to the law, the
standard is correctness. However, the manner in which the correct
legal principles are applied to the facts is a question of mixed law
and fact, and should be reviewed on the standard of reasonableness.27
[emphasis added]

Thus, the Court concluded that, with regard to the issues that go to the
“scope of the submission to arbitration”, the standard of review it would
apply on questions of law is correctness, and the standard on a question
of mixed law and fact is reasonableness.28 Once the Court considers the
issues in the event it is mistaken in its assessment of the jurisdictional
question, the Federal Court appears to apply the pragmatic and functional approach after all.
was that the arbitrators had decided issues outside the scope of their auof a Party” was broad enough to conclude that the Tribunal’s interpreta23

S.D. Myers, supra note 4 at paras. 38-39. The Court noted that such an approach is not provided for in Article 34 of the Commercial Arbitration Code.
24
However, in Feldman the Ontario Superior Court seems to suggest it is applying the pragmatic and functional approach when it applies the factors from Pushpanathan (Feldman, supra
note 16 at para. 82) .
25
S.D. Myers, supra note 4 at para. 40.
26
2003 F.C.A. 248.
27
S.D. Myers, supra note 4 at para. 59.
28
Ibid. at 58.
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the facts was “reasonable”.29 The Court rejected Canada’s position that
SDMI had no “investment” because control of Meyers Canada was not
based on the legal ownership of shares. It considered that a strict application of Canadian domestic law (the Canada Business Corporations
Act) was too narrow and legalistic as well as contrary to the purposive
interpretation mandated by Article 2.01 of NAFTA and Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention.30 The Court then found that, though SDMI’s investment activities could also be characterized as cross-border trade in
services regulated under Chapter 12, the Tribunal was correct in not precluding Chapter 11 from applying to SDMI’s rights and obligations.31
As the issue involving national treatment in “like circumstances” was
a question of mixed fact and law, the Court agreed that the Tribunal’s
decision was reasonable.32
The second ground which Canada relied upon was that the award
case as relating to “fundamental notions and principles of justice.”33
The Federal Court held that the Tribunal decision did not in fact violate
Canadian public policy as it could not be said to be “patently unreadenial of justice”.34 The facts which the Tribunal found, and the Court
accepted, did not make for a particularly strong public policy argument
in this case, and it will be interesting to see how Canadian courts approach this argument under other circumstances.
As evidenced in this decision, there is little room for judicial review
of international arbitral awards under Chapter 11. This narrow approach
is “in keeping with the expectations of the parties, who in the commercial context, have expressly chosen to remove their dispute from the
jurisdiction of national courts.”35 To this end the Federal Court stated:
29

Ibid. at para. 66.
Ibid. at para. 71.
31
Ibid. at para. 74.
32
Ibid. at para. 55
33
Ibid. at para 56.
34
Noah Rubins, “Judicial Review of Investment Arbitration Awards” (2004) in Todd Weiler,
ed., NAFTA: Investment Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, Current Practice, Future Prospects,
(Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2004) 375 [Rubins].
35
S.D. Myers, supra note 4 at para. 39.
30
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Courts restrain themselves from exercising judicial review with
respect to international arbitration tribunals so as to be sensitive to
the need of a system for predictability in the resolution of disputes
and to preserve the autonomy of the arbitration forum selected by
the parties.36

mestic courts to oversee arbitral tribunal decisions. The Ontario Superior Court took a similar position in Feldman. Otherwise, the effect would
be to transfer to the courts the jurisdiction that is intended, by NAFTA,
to be vested in the arbitrators.37 Canadian courts seem to agree that deference to arbitral tribunals is necessary to ensure the predictability of
the enforcement of dispute resolution provisions, and to facilitate freer
trade on an international scale.38

IV. CONSISTENCY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The applicable standard of judicial review can still vary depending on
the circumstances of the case. The standard of review for arbitral decisions is determined by domestic legislation, without any treaty restriction: “[D]ifferent arbitration statutes will cover—or fail to cover—Chapter 11 awards. And different statutes will limit differently the scope of
review.”39 The United States and Mexico may apply their own domestic
legislation in determining their domestic courts’ scope of review. Canadian federal law applies if the arbitration takes place in Canada and the
award is issued by an arbitral tribunal against Canada. If, however, as
in Metalclad, the arbitration occurs in Canada, but the award is issued
against another country, then the law of the particular province is applied.40

36

Rubins, supra note 35 at 387.
S.D. Meyers, supra note 4 at para. 42.
38
Jeffery Atik, “Repenser NAFTA Chapter 11: A Catalogue of Legitimacy Critiques” (2003) 3
Asper Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 215 at 225.
39
Jeffery Atik, “Legitimacy, Transparency and NGO Participation in the NAFTA Chapter 11
Process” in Todd Weiler, ed., NAFTA: Investment Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, Current
Practice, Future Prospects, (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2004) 143.
40
Rubins, supra note 35 at 376.
37
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In the case of Metalclad, the issue of judicial review was raised in
the context of which domestic legislation applied. The British Columbia
Commercial Arbitration Act would allow the courts to re-examine the
merits of the dispute and set aside an award on the basis of an error of
law. On the other hand, the British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Act limited the Court to setting aside the award only in
cases of serious procedural defects.41 In applying the latter legislation,
the Court upheld part of the Tribunal’s decision because there was no
error in arbitral procedure.42 However, the Court found that the Tribunal
had gone beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration and therefore set aside a portion of the Tribunal award.43 Critics of the judgment
suggested that the Court’s approach intruded into the merits of the case
and that the decision could lead more states to seek judicial review of
arbitration decisions.44
The perception that domestic courts cannot be trusted to deal with
foreign commercial investment claims in an unbiased manner is redirected at Chapter 11, one article states:
[T]he fundamental reason that the great majority of modern
investment protection treaties have opted for international
adjudication is that domestic courts are often in fact, and, just as
important, usually perceived to be, biased against alien investors,
especially when those courts must evaluate and pronounce upon
acts of their own governments.45

The Federal Court’s decision in Meyers, however, should allay the concerns raised by Metalclad. The Court reviewed Canadian jurisprudence
and made it clear that extensive judicial deference should be granted to
Chapter 11 arbitral tribunals. In its judgment, the Court emphasized that
judicial review of arbitration awards negatively affects both the speed
46

41

Metalclad, supra note 15 at para. 91.
Ibid. at para 78.
43
Rubins, supra note 35 at 380.
44
Charles N. Brower and Lee A. Steven, “Who Then Should Judge?: Developing the International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11” (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 193 at 196 [Brower and
Steven].
45
S.D. Meyers, supra note 4 at para. 42.
46
Brower and Steven, supra note 45 at 200.
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In addition to their possible bias, domestic courts are regarded as
less able to understand the complexities of international commercial investment law, as compared to the experts chosen to constitute an arbitral
panel.47 Canadian courts, however, appear cognizant of, and responsive
to, this concern. Canadian courts, in reviewing decisions from both domestic administrative tribunals and Chapter 11 arbitration tribunals,
have recognized that the expertise of arbitration panels requires courts
to accord deference to their decisions.

V. CONCLUSION
The Meyers
edged that it cannot interfere in the decisions of arbitration tribunals
to import a standard of judicial review which is not contemplated by
relevant legislation, which in Meyers was the Commercial Arbitration
Code. The Court appeared to recognize that if it were to do so, the result
in the Chapter 11 arbitration tribunal process. If Canadian courts follow the reasoning of the Federal Court, the result should be that “if the
Tribunal has jurisdiction, the correct procedures are followed and the
correct formalities are observed, the award—good, bad or indifferent
48
However, the Court’s perspective as to the “pragmatic and practical” approach to the judicial standard
of review is not as clear as it could be. It will be interesting to see how
tribunals in future cases.

47

S.D. Meyers, supra note 4 at para. 42.

